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Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of desistance scholarship, surveying some of the major 
theoretical and empirical explanations of how and why people stop offending, and exploring the 
implications of this body of work for criminal justice. Traditionally, criminology has been 
focused on the study of crime and in particular on the causes of crime, as well as criminal justice 
responses to it. By comparison, examining how and why people stop and refrain from offending, 
and considering which criminal justice responses might support or frustrate such processes has a 
much shorter history. We would argue that it is also an area of study which, despite being in 
some senses bound by its focus on crime and offending, nonetheless transcends more orthodox 
criminological concerns and ultimately compels those who study it to engage with more 
fundamental questions of political philosophy (as well as with other disciplinary perspectives). 
We want to argue therefore that desistance research is (or at least can be) a form of ‘alternative 
criminology’ both in the way it frames its objects of inquiry and in the ways it pushes it towards 
disciplinary borders and intersections.  
We want to stress at the outset that criminal justice -- and indeed the contributions of 
criminologists -- need not necessarily be oriented towards or supportive of desistance. It seems 
obvious to us (as it may be to many contributors to a volume concerned with ‘alternatives’) that 
some of what is done in the name of justice may be criminogenic rather than constructive. We 
know, for example, that in many jurisdictions incarceration in general tends to increase the risks 
of future crime and criminalisation (Gaes and Camp, 2009; Cullen, Jonson and Nagin, 2011; 
Cochran, Mears and Bales, 2014). The influence of some forms of probation supervision with 
regards to desistance may be more positive, but that influence appears to remain modest in most 
cases (see Farrall, 2002; King, 2014).  
It is unsurprising therefore that desistance scholars have regularly called for the reconfiguration 
of criminal justice, arguing that systems-level change (and even structural and cultural social 
change) is needed to better support desistance and social re/integration [we use the form 
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‘re/integration’ as a way of acknowledging that not all of those that criminal justice may seek to 
reintegrate have ever been meaningfully integrated in the first place (Carlen, 2012)]. This is not to 
say that desistance processes cannot begin and be supported in prison or during community 
supervision, but it is to recognise the need to unsettle any established assumptions, especially 
among criminal justice professionals and policymakers, that punishment can somehow produce 
positive change.  
Nevertheless, in this chapter we take the opportunity to describe both a body of knowledge and 
a philosophical-methodological approach that is relevant to diverse forms of ‘alternative 
criminologies’ and their different visions of the future. Thus, in this chapter, we also support 
advances towards what might be termed ‘epistemic emancipation’ and shifts in the dynamics of 
penal power. Specifically, we illustrate how giving greater credence to the expertise and 
experiences of people with convictions, alongside the contributions of criminologists and 
criminal justice professionals, can reshape criminal justice debates. 
The first section of this chapter establishes some of the key theories and landmark studies which 
underpin contemporary desistance scholarship. Following this, the potential implications of 
desistance research are explored in terms of penal power, professional power, and people’s lived 
experiences of punishment and re/integration. A more reflexive discussion follows this, 
engaging with a number of recent critiques levelled at desistance scholarship.  
The final section of the chapter shifts to a more utopian, forward-looking vision, charting how 
and why this body of knowledge might inform ‘alternative criminologies’ as well as perhaps 
alternatives to criminology in pursuit of different, better futures. Throughout the chapter, we will 
strive to insist on the links between personal change, penal change and socio-cultural change. 
Within this exercise of examining the present and envisioning futures, compelling arguments for 
change in criminology also emerge. We suggest that criminology has found itself beleaguered by 
some unhelpful divisions. Diversity of alternatives is surely a good thing; and it need not 
preclude potential synergies or the development of a shared vision. In particular, we aim to 
explore perceived differences and potential alliances between ‘critical criminology’ and desistance 
scholarship. 
 
Explaining Desistance from Crime 
Defining Desistance from Crime 
Despite an international body of knowledge developed over decades about how and why people 
desist from crime, defining what desistance is and figuring out how such a definition might be 
operationalised present enduring problems. Fundamentally, desistance refers to the permanent 
cessation of offending behaviour. It is probably fair to say that desistance research has tended to 
take a relatively un-critical approach to the terms ‘crime’ and ‘offending behaviour’; and that its 
focus has been very much on the sorts of crime, offending and social harm that are commonly 
processed in the criminal justice system, rather than, for example, white collar crime, corporate 
crime, or state crime (for exceptions, see van Onna et al., 2014; Hunter, 2015). However, there is 
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no inherent reason why desistance research could not extend its conceptual and methodological 
reach into exploring how and why the powerful (sometimes) desist from their crimes; indeed, in 
the broader socio-legal literature on regulation and compliance, some such connections have 
begun to be made (see Crawford and Hucklesby, 2012; McNeill and Robinson, 2012).  
Even leaving the question of the definition and scope of crime and offending aside – a difficulty 
emerges in accurately determining when someone has stopped offending, and how or from 
whom this information might be known. Most markedly in the 1990s, researchers sought to 
establish thresholds or timeframes for the absence of offending behaviour and the absence of 
criminal justice responses to it (whether re-arrest, reconviction, or re-incarceration). For 
example, some defined desistance in terms of non-offending throughout a period of less than 
one year (Loeber et al., 1991), or no arrests in three years following release from prison (Shover 
and Thompson, 1992; Uggen and Kruttschnitt, 1998), or the last conviction having occurred 
before age 31 years and having no reconviction or incarceration for at least ten years 
(Mischkowitz, 1994 in Kazemian, 2015: 4). These types of definitions characterise desistance as 
the absence of re-offending and/or the absence of processing within the criminal justice system 
(which, of course, are far from being the same thing), against somewhat arbitrary time and age 
thresholds (not one of which has attracted widespread consensus). In other words, they define 
what desistance is by seeking to clarify what it is not. On their own, these definitions risk 
becoming unhelpfully caught up with similar debates surrounding the definition and 
measurement of recidivism rates (e.g., some jurisdictions define recidivism against the threshold 
of reconviction in two years post-sentence).  
Since the 2000s, desistance scholars have more commonly come to conceptualise and debate 
desistance as a process rather than an event or as the moment of crossing an arbitrary threshold. 
This shift does not mean that timeframes and ages/life stages become irrelevant, but rather that 
they are reframed as methodological concerns which are related to desistance, but do not suffice 
as an overarching definition in and of themselves. Kazemian (2015: 1) explains desistance as a 
gradual process which involves ‘a series of cognitive, social, and behavioural changes leading up 
to the cessation of criminal behaviour.’ This implies that the thoughts and actions of the 
individual are connected to or influenced by the social context and social dynamics of desistance 
processes. She uses the work of Le Blanc and Fréchette (1989) to show that reductions in the 
frequency and seriousness of re-offending, especially for those with a prolific criminal career, are 
often pre-cursors to permanently stopping offending. The explanation used in this chapter 
complements Kazemian’s definition. Here, we conceptualise desistance as a dynamic process of 
human development – one that is situated in and profoundly affected by its social contexts – in 
which persons move away from offending and towards social re/integration (McNeill, 2016).  
Maruna and Farrall (2004) differentiate, on the one hand, the temporal and behavioural aspects 
of desistance from, on the other hand, its developmental and identity-related aspects. They 
explain these respectively in terms of primary and secondary desistance, mirroring Lemert’s (1951) 
famous distinction between primary and secondary deviance. Primary desistance denotes the 
cessation of offending behaviour, including temporary absences or gaps in the commission of 
crime. This recognises the intermittency of offending behaviour, even for those with persistent 
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criminal careers. It focuses on what a person is or isn’t doing. Secondary desistance explains the 
sustained cessation of offending behaviour over time. It involves the termination of a criminal 
career, and the adoption of new roles and identities which signify that a person has changed such 
that they now comply with the law and social norms (Maruna and Farrall, 2004). Extending 
beyond the behavioural realm of doing and related concerns about activities or events, secondary 
desistance shifts the focus towards being and becoming in a person’s life. It recognises the 
existential and interactional nature of ‘the looking glass self’ in how people make sense of 
themselves and one another, in turn affecting how they act and relate in processes of change (see 
Maruna, LeBel, Mitchell and Naples, 2004). The negative impact of labelling prevalent in systems 
of punishment starts to be reversed when people identify themselves, and are identified by 
others, as parents, neighbours, colleagues, tax payers and other socially valorised ‘master statuses’ 
(see Chapter 2 of Graham, 2016) which, in time, surpass those of ‘offender’ and ‘ex-offender’.  
More recently, McNeill (2016) has proposed the additional notion of tertiary desistance. This refers 
‘not just to shifts in behaviour or identity but to shifts in one’s sense of belonging to a (moral 
and political) community’, encompassing ‘how one sees one’s place in society’ and how one is 
seen by others (McNeill, 2016: 201). An emphasis on belonging foregrounds the relational and 
structural contexts of desistance. Processes of secondary and tertiary desistance and of 
community re/integration entail more than instrumental compliance with the law and ‘behaving 
well’ (e.g., going straight, obeying rules, cooperating with authorities, demonstrating pro-social 
behaviours). They also sometimes involve processes of ‘making good’ (expressing the human 
need for generativity and for contributing to the wellbeing of others, for example, fulfilling 
obligations as a partner, a parent or citizen; see Maruna, 2001). But belonging also implies being a 
recipient of social goods (that is, someone enjoying fair access to all the resources, rights and 
opportunities routinely afforded to other citizens; see McNeill, 2012 on ‘social rehabilitation’).  
If primary desistance signifies a superficial form of development or change, then perhaps tertiary 
desistance points towards the possibility of its fulfilment, where the status degradations of 
punishment become less pronounced or are reversed altogether (see Maruna, 2011) and where, 
for some, even the notion of desistance loses its explanatory power to make sense of a life-
course in which neither offending nor desistance are defining features. In an era of penal states 
pursuing greater and greater post-punishment disqualification and discrimination, fuelled by 
populist punitiveness (Bottoms, 1995; Garland, 2013), the sobering reality is that significant 
numbers of people with convictions will never be allowed to realise tertiary desistance. These are 
the people who, to borrow Alessandro De Giorgi’s (2014) phrase, experience ‘re-entry to 
nothing’. Nonetheless, their primary and secondary desistance can sometimes survive in spite of 
ongoing discrimination and social-structural exclusion, even decades later. 
To summarise, event-driven and measurement-focused conceptualisations of desistance popular 
in the 1990s limit understanding to questions of ‘what’ offending has or has not occurred within 
a given time frame. While useful at a practical level of explaining research design and findings, 
this paints a simplistic picture of desistance as measured by variables which fail to illuminate the 
meanings and circumstances influencing how and why some people desist while others do not. In 
contrast, process-oriented conceptualisations of desistance better reveal the influence of both 
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agentic and socio-structural factors, situating human development and the struggle to desist in 
their relational and social contexts. Explaining desistance as a process does not mean that 
desistance scholars prescribe the route, nor expect ‘going straight’ to be a one-off rational choice 
and linear transition from A to B. Desistance, at least for people with significant histories of 
criminalisation, is typically much more complex than that. A significant body of empirical 
evidence identifies some of the key contributing factors and developments observed in many 
desistance journeys, as well as the structural impediments that frustrate them (see Farrall and 
Calverley, 2006; Farrall et al, 2014). Yet the ‘escape routes’ and lived experiences of life after 
crime and punishment are diverse and varied (see Farrall, Hough, Maruna, and Sparks, 2011). 
There is no one cause of desistance, just as there is no one theory which can fully explain it. 
 
Desistance Theories and Related Concepts 
Desistance theories are usually clustered into three or four theoretical perspectives, which are 
briefly summarised here.  
Ontogenic desistance theories highlight the age-crime curve which demonstrates that both 
recorded and self-reported crime is disproportionately committed by young people under the age 
of 30, suggesting that most people, even those with prolific criminal careers, desist as part of the 
ageing and maturation processes (Uggen, 2000; Laub and Sampson, 2001; Sampson and Laub, 
2005). Hirschi and Gottfredson’s (1983; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1986) age-invariance theory 
was a pre-cursor to contemporary ontogenic theories. Their research established links between 
offending behaviour and issues of impulsivity, risk taking and low self-control, which they 
observed in the lives of some young people and which informed their view of ageing as the 
overarching influence on desistance from crime.  
Sociogenic desistance theories emphasise the relationship between desistance as a human 
developmental process and associated shifts in social roles and social bonds, especially those 
commonly involved in the transition to adulthood. For example, in proposing an age-graded 
theory of informal social control, Sampson and Laub (2005) are critical of adopting too narrow a 
focus on ageing, suggesting that this presents a somewhat deterministic perspective which does 
little to explain how and why desistance occurs. Their theorisation instead locates human 
development and maturation in the context of the relationship between the individual and 
society, including the structural influences of social control. More recently, drawing on 
longitudinal data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study, Fabio and colleagues (2011) demonstrate 
how social-structural factors influence variations in the age-crime curve and mediate ontogenic 
theorisations of desistance. Their study of the age-crime curve for a sample cohort found that, 
‘compared with boys in advantaged neighbourhoods, rates of violence among boys in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods rose to higher levels that were sustained significantly longer’ 
(Fabio et al., 2011: S325). 
Sociogenic theories acknowledge the importance both of new social bonds (for example, 
intimate and/or co-habiting relationships) and of changing social bonds (for example, changing 
friendship groups or changes within friendship groups (see Weaver, 2015)). Both new and 
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changing social bonds can have a positive influence on how a person sees and thinks about 
themselves, their identity and social standing, as well as their uses of their time (Giordano et al., 
2003). Sociogenic theorisations share synergies with notions of secondary and tertiary desistance 
discussed earlier. They draw attention not just to the positive role played by certain social bonds 
in desistance, but also to the damage that is often done to such bonds by punishment. Thus a 
sociological account of the ‘structuration’ of desistance, attending to the interactions between 
human agency and structure, underscores how incarceration constrains or damages positive 
social bonds with family and significant others and frustrates maturation and desistance 
processes (Farrall and Bowling, 1999; Farrall and Calverley, 2006). Weaver’s (2012, 2013, 2015) 
research builds on that of others in this area to offer one of the most cogent and integrated 
empirical accounts of the relational and social dynamics of offending and desistance. 
The third theoretical perspective, loosely described as identity theories, highlights the subjective 
dimensions associated with ageing, human development and changing social bonds. Central to 
this theorisation is the need to understand changes in people’s narratives and personal and social 
identities. People do not just become parents as a personal milestone or event; they identify 
themselves and are identified by others as parents. Many people cite their children as the 
principal reason for their desistance. Others have children and yet persist in their criminal 
careers. It is for this reason that individual differences and diversity in the meanings and 
subjective value of life-course related experiences are explored in identity theories which warn 
against over-generalisation or universal claims about new roles and social bonds, such as 
parenthood or employment (Farrall, 2002; Farrall and Calverley, 2006; Paternoster and Bushway, 
2009). Maruna’s (2001) phenomenology of desistance and Gadd’s (2006; Gadd and Farrall, 2004) 
psychosocial theory of desistance and reform are prominent examples which emphasise issues of 
identity and narrative in their social context. Similarly, Soares da Silva and Rossetti-Ferreira 
(2002) conceptualise ending a criminal career as a developmental process located within a 
network of meanings, affecting personal and social identity. Identity theories draw attention to 
the de-labelling process of becoming known as someone or something else; that is, something 
other than the stigmatising labels of ‘offender’ and (even) ‘ex-offender.’  
Just as punishment can delay maturation and disrupt social bonds, it can also undermine positive 
shifts in identity or narrative, for example by reducing or removing opportunities to participate 
in personally and socially valued roles, and by creating structural impediments which negatively 
impact on people’s identities, sense of citizenship and belonging. The concept of generativity is 
commonly used to explain positive transitions and features of human development, especially as 
people progress through adulthood, as well as the personal and moral dimensions of helping 
others in processes of desistance, irrespective of age and life stage (see McAdams, Hart and 
Maruna, 1998). Taking on generative roles (e.g., peer mentor, volunteer, parent, animal foster 
carer, community activist) that involve altruistic helping and citizenship values can yield 
restorative benefits for individuals and their communities (for diverse examples, see Graham and 
White, 2015). Maruna’s (2001: 117) Liverpool Desistance Study offers a cogent account of how 
‘the desisting self-narrative frequently involves reworking a delinquent history into a source of 
wisdom to be drawn from while acting as a drug counsellor, youth worker, community 
volunteer, or mutual-help group participant.’ In this study, desisters described generative pursuits 
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as fulfilling, exonerating, therapeutic, and as a source of legitimacy or restitution (Maruna, 2001). 
To illustrate, one person who had desisted from offending describes wanting to restore a sense 
of positive legacy for the benefit of his children, while another describes her desire to become a 
social worker so that she can use her lived experience to help others change their lives: 
I owe [my children] a lot, you see… I’ve been in [prison] twice since. I haven’t actually paid them 
back to say I’m sorry. I want to do it in a nice way. I want to leave them something. I want to give 
them something back… (Male, age 40, in Maruna, 2001: 122). 
I want to show people the positive side of social work… I want to show people that I’ve been 
there, I’ve been through this stuff, so I can relate to what they’re going through (Female, age 26, in 
Maruna, 2001: 120) 
However, people’s efforts to change by ‘making good’, ‘giving back’ and taking on pro-social 
helping roles need to be recognised and reciprocated by communities, practitioners and civil 
society, and enabled by the law and the state (Weaver and McNeill, 2010). Generativity without 
reciprocity is likely to involve unequal social relations and conditions which may lead to some of 
the issues and critiques raised later in this chapter. Moreover, the deprivations of status and 
citizenship inherent in various forms of felon disenfranchisement and disqualification also 
inhibit and frustrate generativity (Uggen, Manza and Thompson, 2006). Maruna highlights how 
people in Western societies seek to control or edit their narratives to conform to ‘our’ 
expectations of returning ‘ex-offenders.’ Instead, the hopeful optimism of desisters is contrasted 
with the expectations of ‘sad’ and sorry tales of guilt and shame expected by a punitive public 
suspicious of their reform and return (Maruna, 2001: 145). 
In the Brazilian context, there are examples in some (but not all, see Macaulay, 2015) faith-based 
prisons and resocialisation centres where generativity and reciprocity appear to feature. Where 
this is realised, it is achieved through a combination of (1) ‘peer-facilitated rehabilitation’, where 
former prisoners in desistance and recovery processes offer generative peer support to current 
prisoners embarking on such processes; (2) ‘community-facilitated rehabilitation’ and ‘co-
produced resocialisation’, involving other citizens from faith groups, NGOs and other 
community groups and civil society; and (3) generative giving by prisoners as citizens through 
activities like helping with local community projects and donation of goods (e.g., food they have 
grown or produced) (Darke, 2015; Macaulay, 2015). 
Recently, in addition to ontogenic, sociogenic and identity theories, Bottoms (2013, 2014) has 
suggested a fourth set of factors relevant to desistance that are situational in character (see also 
Farrall, et al., 2014). Drawing on his expertise in socio-spatial criminology, as well as on 
desistance research, Bottoms points out that various aspects of our social environments and of 
our situated ‘routine activities’ also provide importance influences on our behaviour, for better 
or worse. While our environments and activities are closely connected to our social bonds or ties 
(for example, bonds within intimate relationships and to families, work and faith communities), 
they deserve attention in their own right. 
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Applications and Implications 
Although desistance research has a considerable history, the development of debates about the 
policy and practice implications of the research is relatively recent; indeed, not much was written 
in this vein until this century. This may be accounted for partly by the emphasis in earlier studies 
on desistance as a ‘natural’ and normative process; if desistance is about ‘growing out of crime’ 
(Rutherford, 1986), and if scholars were primarily interested in observing and explaining this as a 
natural phenomenon, then the disjunction between the literatures on desistance and on 
rehabilitative interventions perhaps makes some sense. The two bodies of work are interested in 
similar outcomes (the ending of offending) but focused on quite different processes. 
That said, as early as 1937, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck (1937/1966, see also 1950) did pose the 
question of whether criminal justice interventions could ‘force the plant’ in terms of accelerating 
‘natural’ maturational processes. Even if desistance theories are now more complex and 
comprehensive, the question of whether a richer understanding of the process can support the 
design of better responses to offending remains an open one. We have already cited evidence 
that punishment in general (and imprisonment in particular) may often impede and frustrate 
desistance. But before we turn to the evolution of debates about desistance-based policies and 
practices, it might be helpful to offer at least one elaboration of the process that such policies 
and practices might seek to accelerate. 
The most recent, and perhaps most complete, elucidation of this process has been provided by 
Bottoms and Shapland (2011). Their Sheffield based study follows 113 men who had been 
involved in persistent offending and whose mean age at the time of first interview was 20. The 
men were followed up for 3-4 years, with an intended total of four research interviews during 
that period (see also Shapland and Bottoms, 2011). The model of the desistance process that 
they discerned involves seven stages in which (1) current offending is influenced by a triggering 
event; which leads to the formulation of (2) the wish to try to change. This leads the person (3) 
to think differently about himself or his surroundings; which leads him (4) to take action towards 
desistance. However, these fledgling attempts to desist may be (5) threatened by obstacles, 
barriers and temptations, so the desister must find (6) reinforcing factors (from within himself or 
more likely within his changing social relations) to maintain the change which, if successful, may 
ultimately enable with (7) the establishment of a crime-free identity. The model also identifies the 
importance of two key drivers of change; these rest in the pre-programmed potential of the 
individual (that is, the personal assets of liabilities that they possess as a result of their life-course 
to date) and their social capital resources (in the form of networks of relationships that might 
support or impede their desistance efforts).  
This articulation of the ‘natural’ process is a helpful starting point for debates about criminal 
justice interventions for several reasons. First and foremost, and in contrast with models of 
rehabilitative processes, it is not a model of intervention; it is a model of change. As one of us 
once put it, the process of desistance exists before, behind and beyond any intervention intended 
to support or accelerate it (McNeill, 2006), and the accomplishment of desistance is not in any 
simple sense a result of intervention, even if intervention could be shown to support the process 
(McNeill, et al, 2012). In stark contrast with the implicit model of change in the voluminous 
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literature on ‘What Works?’ to reduce reoffending (and even in contrast with the logic of that 
question), desistance is not an outcome that can be produced by applying well-engineered tools 
to unpromising raw materials; rather, it is an organic process; one that can be carefully cultivated 
or husbanded to enable flourishing -- or neglected and trampled. 
Thus while Bottoms and Shapland’s (2011) account of the process of change neither mentions 
nor requires intervention at any stage, it is capacious enough to admit multiple points at which 
intervention might or might not be helpful in cultivating desistance. Intervention might be a 
trigger at step 1. It might develop or enhance motivation at step 2. It might encourage reflection 
at step 3. It might support action at step 4. It might remove obstacles, or help the person 
overcome them at step 5. It might provide the reinforcement required at step 6, and it might 
provide a means of recognising change at step 7. More generally, turning to the two drivers of 
change, intervention might work to enhance a person’s potential and it might develop his or her 
social capital resources, so as to support change efforts. 
The organic metaphor of cultivating a plant’s flourishing (in the form of growth, flowering and 
fruitfulness) might however be extended further. Two common criticisms of ‘What Works?’ 
research on offender rehabilitation – or more accurately of its implementation through policies 
and practices influenced by new public management (McNeill, 2001) -- are that it tends to 
neglect diversity (Kendall, 2004; Hannah-Moffat, 2005) and, more generally, to neglect the social 
and structural contexts of both offending and desistance. As such, ‘What Works?’ approaches 
(often reduced both in academic debates and in practice to the Risk-Needs-Responsivity model 
of offender rehabilitation [see Polashek, 2012]) are sometimes accused of being too readily co-
opted to the managerialising, commodifying and responsibilising tendencies associated with the 
late-modern ‘culture of control’ (Garland, 2001) or of the neo-liberal penal state (Wacquant, 
2009). To extend our organic metaphor, they seem to pay insufficient attention to the soil, the 
weather and the wider climates that may affect growth (McNeill, 2012). 
These criticisms can be and have been overstated. While it is true that approaches to 
rehabilitation that emerge from correctional psychology tend to predictably prioritise individual 
psychological ‘targets of intervention’ (often in the form of supposed ‘cognitive deficits’), and 
usually commend cognitive-behavioural interventions, the underpinning theories are in fact 
social-psychological in character. Social and environmental factors do feature in their accounts of 
the aetiology of offending (see Bonta and Andrews, 2010), even if they tend to be written out of 
their prescriptions for ‘treatment’. These sorts of interventions aim to feed and prune the plant 
perhaps, but they don’t tend the soil, or build structures to protect it from the weather.  
One of the key contributions of desistance theories has been to redress this imbalance. From the 
outset of their engagement with debates about policy and practice, desistance scholars have 
stressed the importance to desistance of both personal motivations and social contexts (e.g., 
Farrall, 2002), of both personal agency and social support or reaction (Maruna, 2001). Early 
forays into these debates also stressed the importance of personal and professional relationships 
in change processes, in an effort to de-centre correctional ‘programmes’ as the putative agents of 
change (see Rex, 1999, McNeill, 2003, Burnett and McNeill, 2005). 
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Desistance scholars also began to argue for a less offence-focused and more prospective outlook 
in practice. One oft-quoted participant in Farrall’s (2002) landmark study summed up the 
problem with the then prevailing retrospective orientation of practice thus: 
‘Something to do with self progression. Something to show people what they are capable of 
doing. I thought that was what [my Officer] should be about. It’s finding people’s abilities and 
nourishing and making them work for those things. Not very consistent with going back on what 
they have done wrong and trying to work out why – ‘cause it’s all going around on what’s 
happened – what you’ve already been punished for – why not go forward into something… I 
know that you have to look back to a certain extent to make sure that you don’t end up like that 
[again]. The whole order seems to be about going back and back and back. There doesn’t seem 
to be much ‘forward’’ (Farrall, 2002: 225). 
Aside from the content of this quote, it is also important that this insight and many others 
generated through studies of the lived experience of the struggle for desistance were taken 
seriously by desistance scholars, spawning a series of prescriptions for ‘desistance-focused 
probation’ (e.g., McNeill, 2003). Studies focused on the lived experience of desistance allowed 
people in these processes to emerge not as bundles of problems, needs or risks to be researched, 
classified, managed or treated but as people whose knowledge and experience could be a 
resource not only for their own development, but for the development of penal policy and 
practice. Arguments about the development of a desistance paradigm for rehabilitation (McNeill, 
2006, Maruna and LeBel, 2010) took this approach further; recasting rehabilitation as a means of 
supporting individual and social change, partly by recasting its objects as human subjects. To 
borrow Rotman’s (1990) distinction, the desistance paradigm argued both a normative and an 
empirical case for approaches to rehabilitation that were anthropocentric rather than 
authoritarian; rejecting a medical model of expert-led change. 
By the end of the first decade of this century (also the first decade of research on how desistance 
might be better supported), it had become possible to discern eight practical principles that 
seemed to emerge from desistance research (McNeill, et al., 2012). Firstly, the complex challenges 
of desistance (not least in unpromising social contexts) needed to be better understood in 
criminal justice contexts; practices had to better adapt to the realities of lapses and relapses, not 
treating all non-compliance as defiance. Secondly, given both the subjectivities involved in 
desistance and its differing cultural and structural contexts, practices needed to be more 
responsive to diversity in the process. Thirdly, since research had begun to reveal the importance 
of hope in desistance, policy and practice needed to find ways to nurture hope. Likewise, if 
desistance involved the discovery of agency, then policy and practice needed to encourage self-
determination, wherever possible. Fifth, since desistance could only be understood within the 
context of social relationships, policy and practice needed to engage with these relationships (and 
not just with individuals). In consequence, the sixth principle stressed the importance of working 
to develop social (and not just human) capital. Seventh, policy and practice needed to look 
beyond risk and need to identify and develop people’s strengths and positive potential. Finally, 
policy and practice, both in its language and in its rituals (Maruna, 2011) needed to convey belief 
in and to recognise and celebrate change, rather than defining people by the behaviours they are 
asked to leave behind. 
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Although these principles were distilled from research that heard and heeded the voices of 
people with lived experience of the desistance process, the principles were nonetheless generated 
by academic researchers. By 2011, it had become apparent to some of us that a more sustained 
engagement with criminal justice reform required a different approach. In the UK, in 
consequence, the Desistance Knowledge Exchange Project was created to bring together people 
with convictions1, people currently under supervision or in prison, members of their families, 
practitioners, managers, policymakers and academics in order to share different forms of 
knowledge and experience and to develop proposals for reform. 
McNeill et al. (2012) report the results of this project in more depth than we can here. But in 
sum, in addition to the sorts of principles outlined above, the participants called for greater 
involvement of people with convictions in the design, delivery and improvement of criminal 
justice processes; the development of more holistic and humanistic support services better 
connected to local communities and committed to challenging inequalities and promoting social 
justice; and public education about desistance and re/integration to break down the ‘them and 
us’ mentality. They also called for two more structural changes to criminal law and justice; first, 
they advocated less reliance on imprisonment as a sanction (especially for women, black men, 
those with mental health problems and those serving short sentences) and suggested the money 
saved should be reinvested in communities. Finally, they argued the case for reforms to the UK 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, which governs the disclosure of criminal convictions.    
What is striking about these proposals is that they extend far beyond the reforms to probation 
practice that were the initial concern of the project. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems not 
too much of an exaggeration to suggest that they perhaps express the manifesto of a nascent 
social movement, at least in Scotland; one which has seen not just increasing influence of 
desistance research in criminal justice, but also (and arguably much more importantly) both the 
establishment of an organisation of people with convictions, Positive Prison ? Positive Futures2, 
which now lobbies very effectively for progressive and practical penal reform and the 
establishment of a new creative practice organisation, Vox Liminis3, which exists in part to use 
the arts as a means of informing and challenging public discourses about punishment and 
re/integration (see McNeill, 2016).              
Critiques 
Despite the advances noted above, scholarship concentrated on how and why people stop 
offending, perhaps foreseeably, attracts concerns that it ignores or detracts from wider 
influences beyond the individual. Critics have begun to suggest that desistance scholars offer a 
reductionist account of crime and its cessation which simultaneously de-contextualises and 
responsibilises individuals for their own desistance and reintegration. In essence, desistance 
research is seen by some as being ‘too agentic’ and too heavily predicated on individualistic 
notions of rational actors exercising human agency (Baldry, 2010; Carlton and Baldry, 2013; 
                                                          
1 This is the preferred term of people with convictions in Scotland for those in their position. In other jurisdictions 
and contexts, more common terms might be ‘formerly incarcerated people’ or ‘ex-offenders’.  
2 See: Positive Prison ? Positive Futures http://www.positiveprison.org 
3 See: Vox Liminis http://www.voxliminis.co.uk  
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Scraton, 2014). To de-contextualise and de-politicise crime is to belie its roots both as a social 
construct and as a social problem.  
We agree that there are aspects of desistance research that, in similar vein with the critiques of 
‘What Works?’ research noted above, if emphasised to the exclusion of other components, risk 
conflation or co-optation with responsibilising and reductionist approaches to punishment and 
rehabilitation. As desistance scholars we are painfully aware of the increasingly repetitious use of 
the catch-cry ‘supporting desistance’, often as though this is delimited to a set of prescriptions 
for how correctional workers can better support individuals to change, rather than looking 
beyond the individual both for the causes and the solutions of crime related problems.  
The ‘too individualistic/too agentic’ critique does usefully highlight a tendency within desistance 
research to focus on individuals as the primary ‘unit of analysis’ (see Weaver, 2015 for an 
important recent exception). There are some good reasons for focusing on the experiences of 
individuals. In our view, any body of research which decentred or discounted the lived 
experiences of people in desistance processes, while making claims about them, would lack 
legitimacy, both methodologically and politically. Instead, the question is how individual and 
shared, collective experiences are best gathered, understood and explained, with critical emphasis 
on the reciprocal influences of context and structure.  
However, despite the criticisms noted above, very few desistance scholars in fact advocate 
rational choice theorisations of desistance (for example, Paternoster and Bushway, 2009; 
Paternoster et al., 2015). Indeed, most desistance scholars routinely reject and challenge 
reductionist and responsibilising approaches to rehabilitation (as should be obvious from the 
preceding section). Considerable intellectual work has already been done to develop 
sophisticated analyses of the relational, institutional and social contexts of desistance (see Farrall, 
2002; Uggen, Manza and Behrens, 2004; McCulloch, 2005; Farrall and Calverley, 2006; LeBel et 
al., 2008; Halsey, 2008; Farrall et al., 2009, 2014; Weaver, 2015; Kay, 2016). Understandings of 
changes in life courses are not divorced from but rather linked to changes in life chances and 
social conditions. Even those commonly identified as identity theorists and sometimes accused 
of offering accounts that are ‘too agentic’, like Maruna and Giordano, in fact tend to take a social 
interactionist approach; hence, for example, the importance for Maruna of both labelling and de-
labelling processes. 
Some feminist critical criminologists have challenged the utility of desistance scholarship on the 
grounds of its capacity to recognise and respond to diversity and discrimination. Their criticisms 
centre on the argument that desistance scholarship has ignored gendered differences in processes 
of crime, criminalisation and desistance from crime. Their research focuses on incarcerated 
women with experiences of victimisation and trauma and processes of re/integration (see Russell 
and Carlton, 2013; Carlton and Segrave, 2016). Carlton and Baldry (2013) explain their 
abolitionist stance in rejecting liberal-reformist discourses of women’s ‘pathways’ in terms of 
imprisonment and desistance as follows: 
Desistance, however, does not escape the criticism we bring to other criminal justice policies and 
programmes – that they are male centric. All the original desistance studies were conducted with 
men in the United States and the United Kingdom, so that the framework was built around men’s 
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experiences. At its heart, the desistance approach is male centric, individualistic and ignores the 
interlocking structural contexts of class, race and gender (Carlton and Baldry, 2013: 65). 
Pollack (2012: 107) sees liberal reformist gender-responsive ‘pathways’ approaches as complicit 
in the ‘hegemonic logic’ of correctionalism which imposes expert notions of ‘who criminalised 
women are and what they need to stop offending.’ Pollack (2012) argues this is a form of 
‘epistemic violence’ which subjugates women’s narratives and identities, and de-politicises the 
social-structural roots of crime as a social problem using the ideological tools of evidence-based 
practices to compel their reform, as if they cannot know themselves. Russell and Carlton (2013: 
479) cite these various concerns, arguing that ‘the resurgence of desistance and lifecourse 
approaches are not simply problematic, they are limiting’ (italics in original), re-stating critiques of 
reductionism and of responsibilising vulnerable women for making ‘better’ choices in the future. 
While these are important warnings for desistance scholars, there are some inaccuracies in these 
critiques, which perhaps reflect a lack of familiarity with the wider desistance literature (and the 
debates within it). It is true – and it is both important and problematic – that most desistance 
research, like most criminology, started with and has privileged men’s experiences. But, in 
contrast to the critics’ claims, the international literature on desistance increasingly highlights 
issues of diversity, especially in relation to the gendered and racialised structural contexts of 
crime, criminalisation and desistance. If, historically, desistance scholarship was less 
sociologically well versed in the impact of macro-processes and generative structures, the same 
cannot be said of contemporary scholarship (for an overview, see Weaver and McNeill, 2010; 
Rodermond et al., 2015). Indeed, even a cursory reading of some of the key desistance studies 
reveals the inclusion of girls and women as research participants (see Liebrich, 1993; Graham 
and Bowling, 1995; Maruna, 2001; Giordano et al., 2002; Blokland and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Smith 
and McVie, 2003; McAra and McVie, 2009; Farrall, 2002; Farrall and Calverley, 2006; Farrall et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, contrary to Baldry’s (2010) and Carlton and Baldry’s (2013) claims, there 
has been a proliferation of scholarship on gender in critically understanding desistance and 
re/integration (for example, Sommers, Baskin and Fagan, 1994; Uggen and Kruttschnitt, 1998; 
McIvor, Murray and Jamieson, 2004; Rumgay, 2004; Leverentz, 2006, 2014; King et al., 2007; 
Søgaard et al., 2015). Others, have used intersectionality, critical race and post-colonial theories 
to explore relationships between  ethnicity, racialisation and desistance (for example, Calverley, 
2013; Glynn 2013, 2015), including in relation to indigenous peoples’s experience of criminal 
justice in Canada (Deane, Bracken and Morrissette, 2007) and Australia (Marchetti and Daly 
(2016). Importantly, findings are also emerging to explain the criminal careers and desistance 
trajectories of white-collar offenders (see van Onna et al., 2014; Hunter, 2015) and how these 
differ from others; although this area currently remains underdeveloped, as we alluded to earlier. 
Just as feminist and (other) critical researchers have used research on women’s different 
pathways into crime and punishment to critique ‘gender-blind’ approaches to women in the 
criminal justice system, so they can and do use research on women’s desistance to argue for 
more constructive approaches (whether abolitionist or not). More generally – and somewhat 
ironically -- some critics write as if desistance is a criminal justice policy or programme. It is not. 
Policies and programmes can be desistance-oriented in that they can be (1) pointed to that purpose 
and/or (2) informed by desistance theories and research. However, like most desistance scholars, 
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and as we have noted above, we conceive of desistance as a process that belongs to desisters 
themselves (McNeill, 2006), irrespective of which criminal justice professional(s) they interact 
with or which sanction is imposed upon them. It is important to stress that this is not to support 
individualisation and responsibilisation. Indeed, it is intended to hold states, civil societies, justice 
systems and practices to account for their roles in supporting or frustrating processes of change 
and development that (nonetheless) belong to individuals.  
Similarly, for the reasons we have already examined above, it is simply erroneous to conflate 
desistance perspectives with correctionalist perspectives on ‘What Works?’ in reducing 
reoffending. While they are not entirely incompatible, there are considerable differences between 
these perspectives.  
 
Utopia, Alternatives and Desistance  
The critiques discussed in the last section represent a useful challenge to aspects of desistance 
research and of its criminal justice applications. However, desistance research itself has also 
begun to expose its own limitations and contradictions, principally by beginning to confront the 
question of what lies beyond desistance from crime? If desistance is a process of development -- 
one that can be cultivated (to return to our earlier metaphor) -- what does it lead to? What kind 
of human flourishing lies beyond desistance from crime?   
The Sheffield Desistance Study suggests the importance of these questions in a particularly bleak 
and powerful way. Bottoms (2013) has argued some people desist through a form of extreme 
‘situational self-binding’ which amounts effectively to the self-imposed incarceration of social 
isolation. Although Bottoms (2013) notes that this was a rare phenomenon in the Sheffield 
study, evidence from other studies suggests that it is not so unusual for those whose desistance 
processes lack personal and social support. Adam Calverley’s (2009) exploration of ethnicity and 
desistance, for example, suggests that Black and Dual Heritage men in one London borough 
faced the greatest structural and cultural obstacles to desistance -- and that they tended to desist 
through isolation. Two recent Scottish studies of very different populations (released long-term 
prisoners and young people exiting an intensive support service) also found common ‘pains of 
desistance’ linked to social isolation and the failure to secure work, connection and belonging 
(see Nugent and Schinkel, 2016). 
These findings paint a dystopian picture of life after desistance, at least for some people. In a 
sense they expose the taken-for-grantedness of the assumption that ending offending is a ‘good’ 
outcome. Not offending may be a good outcome in the sense that it means less harm for society 
and for potential victims, but if it entails increases in the suffering of the person desisting (and 
perhaps of those closest to her or him) then, even on a cold utilitarian logic, the value of this 
outcome remains open. More importantly, for us at least, this sort of post-desistance existence 
cannot be a ‘good enough’ outcome of a justice process. We would argue that criminal justice 
must aim for more ambitious goals than crime reduction through self-incapacitation. Those in 
whose name punishment is delivered have an obligation to restore those whose debts are settled. 
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And those whose offending flows from those social injustices and inequalities that the state 
permits, perpetuates and exacerbates, are owed additional duties of support.  
Re/integration is inescapably a relational, a social and a political process. In contrast to much 
correctional intervention-focused research, desistance research has simultaneously made it clear 
both that improvements to criminal justice practices with individuals to support their change 
processes can be imagined and are required, and that these efforts can never be enough. 
Individual change, and work to support it, can be too easily trampled by failure to attend to the 
social and political dynamics at play in re/integration. As one of us has argued elsewhere 
(McNeill, 2012, 2014; Kirkwood and McNeill, 2015), any serious engagement with the meanings 
of desistance, rehabilitation and re/integration compels us to develop models, policies and 
practices that attend not just to ‘correctional’ processes aimed at individual transformation, but 
to moral reparation (or restoration), judicial rehabilitation and social re/integration too. In most 
cases – and particularly for people with serious and/or long histories of both offending and 
social disintegration -- these four processes are almost always intertwined. It follows that if we 
want to support desistance, much of our work will need to be with communities, civil society 
and the state itself. We will need to work with people with convictions in that process -- but not 
to ‘correct’ them. Rather, we need to learn from them and to work with them in a collective effort 
focused not so much on crime reduction as on building fairer societies. 
Since this book is concerned with ‘Alternatives’, it seems fitting that we end in this somewhat 
utopian vein. Both in sociology (Dawson, 2016) and in criminology (Copson, 2013, Malloch and 
Munro, 2013; Scott and Gosling, 2016) of late there has been a resurgence of interest in utopia 
not just as critique but also as method. The work of Ruth Levitas has been one important 
inspiration in these debates. Levitas defines utopia as ‘the expression of the desire for a better 
way of being or of living’ (Levitas 2013: xii). She argues that visions of utopias can be developed 
as compensation for an unjust status quo (as in some religious utopias); as critique of how things are 
(by contrast with how they might be); and as more or less clearly articulated programmes of 
change (Levitas, 2000; see Dawson, 2016). Levitas’ (2013) work on utopia also argues the need for 
an archaeology -- one that excavates the vision of the good society implicit in any given utopia; for 
an ontology -- one that explores the utopia’s assumptions about human nature; and for an 
architecture of how the utopia is to be built in practice. 
In our assessment, despite the variety of views it encompasses, desistance research has a 
common implicit ontology; it asserts and evidences the positive potential of human subjects and 
sees them as fundamentally social beings that are capable of growth and development, in the 
right circumstances. As such it undermines criminal justice responses (and social attitudes) that 
seek to define and to ‘other’ people with reference to their offending behaviour. To a certain 
extent, desistance research has begun to develop an architecture. Initially, that architecture aimed 
to design a programme of policy and practice reform. Latterly, it has expanded, as Levitas’ work 
implies, to include a much more expansive but still nascent social movement in pursuit of wider 
structural changes.  
What desistance theory and research perhaps lacks, however, is a well-developed archaeology. 
Perhaps because it begins with the assumed problems of offending and of ending offending 
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rather than with what lies behind these problems and their construction, it lacks a well-
articulated vision of the good society. But having said that, as our discussion above illustrates, by 
exploring how we can become better people, desistance research eventually forces us -- through 
theoretical, empirical and normative work -- to explore how to build better communities and 
better societies. Increasingly, it makes clear that these questions cannot, should not and must not 
be separated.  
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